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Dynamic Almost Ideal Demand Systems: 
An Empirical Analysis of Alcohol Expenditure in Ireland 
 
Abstract: This paper presents a dynamic form of the Almost Identical Demand System 
(AIDS). We employ three versions of the AIDS model to determine the preferred long-run 
equilibrium model to use in a dynamic specification, that has similar characteristics to an 
error correction mechanism.  This estimation procedure is applied to the demand for alcohol 
in Ireland.  Beer is found to be price inelastic in both the short and long run.  Spirits is price 
elastic in the short run and price inelastic in the long run.  Wine is price elastic in the both the 
short and long run. 
 
 
I  Introduction 
 
 The interest in modelling demand systems has increased with the availability of 
longer horizon databases and advancements in econometric methodology.  The Almost Ideal 
Demand System (AIDS), developed by Deaton and Muellbauer (1980), remains the most 
popular specification over the last 20 years.  However, a feature of previous demand studies is 
that the point elasticity estimates are not robust to the estimation period.  In particular, it 
appears that the short-run elasticity estimates substantially differ from their long-run values.  
It is this characteristic that we explore in this paper in the context of the demand for alcohol in 
Ireland for the period 1960-1998.  We estimate price and expenditure (income) elasticities for 
three different categories of alcohol: beer, spirits and wine.  Employing a dynamic demand 
system modelling approach, these elasticities are estimated for both short run and long run. 
 The application of this dynamic AIDS model to alcohol demand is of particular 
importance to the drinks industry and to the Irish economy in general.  In 1998, around €4.13 
billion was spent on alcohol products alone.  This constituted around 10% of total personal 
expenditure in Ireland for that year. In terms of employment, Conniffe and McCoy (1993) 
estimated that in 1990 some 33,000 full-time equivalent people were employed in the alcohol 
industry. Foley (1999) showed that this figure had increased to over 43,000 persons by 1998. 
Also, in 1998, the government collected in excise duty some €748 million; €465 million from 
beer sales, €188 million from spirits and €95 million from wine.  As a percentage of 
government's total net receipts, beer was 2.3%, spirits was 0.9% and wine was 0.4%.  
Furthermore, the total tax content on a pint of beer in 1998 was 35.6% of the price and for a 
glass of spirits it was 35.5% of the price (Revenue Commissioners, Statistical Report 1998).  
Analysis of alcohol use in Ireland, particularly in relation to estimation of elasticities is of 
particular importance to both the alcohol industry (in the form of production and pricing 
policies) and the government (in the collection of revenue). 
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 This paper contributes to the existing literature in two ways.  First, with the exception 
of Walsh and Walsh (1970), Thom (1984) and Conniffe and McCoy (1993) there has been no 
substantive economic analysis of the demand for alcoholic beverages in Ireland.  Employing 
more recent econometric techniques and a longer database, the robustness of previous studies 
is investigated.  Second, we advance previous methodology that is employed in estimating 
demand systems using time series data.  We modify the standard Almost Ideal Demand 
System (AIDS) developed by Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) by representing demand as a 
dynamic data generating process (DGP) that allows the use of time series information to 
estimate short- and long-run elasticities.  We apply this methodology to estimate the demand 
elasticities for individual alcoholic drinks in Ireland.  The dynamic AIDS representation is of 
an error correction1 form of the AIDS model, that models the disequilibrium separate from the 
AIDS long-run equilibrium and thus gives the short-run relationship between the demand 
variables. 
 The remainder of the paper is set out as follows.  In Section II we discuss the static 
and dynamic AIDS modelling in estimating elasticities.  This section also contains a short 
review of recent empirical evidence.  The data is outlined in Section III.  Section IV 
investigates the time series properties of the relevant data and provides the econometric 
estimation, including the calculation of long run elasticity measures and tests for the dynamic 
AIDS.  Section V presents the dynamic AIDS results.  A final section concludes. 
 
II  Methodology 
 
Following Deaton and Muellbauer (1980), we define the alcohol expenditure function 
as 
(1)     e(p , v) = a(p) + b(p)v  
 
where, v is the utility and a(p) and b(p) can be regarded as the expenditures costs on 
subsistence and bliss respectively defined as:   
 
(2)     a(p) = α0 + ∑
=
N
i 1
 ai ln(Pi) + (1/2) ∑
=
N
i 1
∑
=
N
j 1
γ*ij lnPi lnPj  
 
(3)     b(p)  =  β0 ∏ Pi  βi    =  β0 P1 β1 P2 β2 P3β3…….      
 
                                               
1
 A comprehensive discussion of the error correction mechanism is given in Hendry, Pagan and Sargan 
(1984) and Engle and Granger (1987). 
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where, the ith commodity price is denoted by Pi and γ*ij is the parameter on the natural log of 
the ith commodity price and the natural log of the jth commodity price. Applying Shepards 
Lemma to the expenditure function (i.e. differentiating with respect to Pi ), the expenditure 
shares (S*i) on each type of alcoholic beverage are: 
 
(4)     S*i = αi + ∑
=
N
j 1
γij lnPi + βi ln(C*/P) + ui   
 
where, γij is the parameter on the log of the jth commodity price, ui is a disequilibrium (or 
error) term, and βi  is the parameter on the log of total alcohol expenditure (C*) divided by P 
where P is the price index given by: 
  
(5)     lnP = α0 + ∑
=
N
i 1
 ln(Pi) + (1/2) ∑
=
N
i 1
∑
=
N
j 1
γij lnPi lnPj   
          and γij = 1/2(γ*ij + γ*ji) 
 
To satisfy the properties of demand functions that are adding up, homogeneity and symmetry, 
the following restrictions were imposed. 
To satisfy the properties of demand functions restrictions such as aggregation, homogeneity 
and symmetry have to be imposed.  Engel aggregation implies ∑
=
N
i 1
βi = 0 while Cournot 
aggregation implies ∑
=
N
i 1
γij  = 0 while further adding up implies ∑
=
N
i 1
 ai = 1.  These conditions 
can be imposed by not estimating one of the equations in the system.  Homogeneity implies 
∑
=
N
j 1
γij  =  0 while symmetry implies γij  =  γji.  However the γij estimated are not the parameter 
estimates from the Slutsky matrix, so that negativity cannot be imposed in an AIDS model. 
The Marshallian price and expenditure elasticities are measured respectively as: 
 
(6)     εMij  =  -δ + 
i
ij
S
γ
 - 
i
i
S
β
Sj                
 
(7)     ηi =  1 + 
i
i
S
β
       
 
where, δ is the Kronecker delta defined equal to 1 if i = j and 0 if i ≠ j. 
 4 
 The AIDS specification is the most popular approach used in modelling demand 
systems in the last 20 years.  For example, during the period 1980-1991, Buse (1994) reports 
that 89 empirical applications used the AIDS in demand studies and of these six have looked 
at alcohol demand: Thom (1984), Jones (1989), Gao, Wailes and Cramer (1995), Nelson and 
Moran (1995), Andrikopoulous, Brox and Carvalho (1997) and Blake and Neid (1997).   The 
success in the application of this static AIDS model relies on the stability of the estimated 
parameters.  However, previous empirical evidence suggests that for most products prices and 
expenditure shares are unit roots and thus in the absence of cointegration, parameter estimates 
- and, by definition, elasticity estimates - are spurious. 
The static AIDS specification ignores potential significant short-run elasticity 
measures that differ from the long-run estimates.  Moreover, in the context of tax policy and 
business strategy, decision-makers are more likely to be more concerned with short-run 
elasticity estimates and the speed to which these estimates reach their long-run level. 
A dynamic version of the AIDS model that incorporates such short-run estimates is 
an error correction representation of the AIDS model.2  This form allows for disequilibrium in 
the short-run by treating the error term ui in (4) as the equilibrium error.  This error term then 
ties the short-run behaviour of the dependent variable to its long-run value.  We therefore 
define the long-run equilibrium as the AIDS solution as given by equation (4), with the 
disequilibrium (or error term) u given by: 
  
(8)     S*i - αi - ∑
=
N
j 1
γij lnPi - βi ln(C*/P) = u     
 
where, u
 
is assumed to be a white noise stationary series process.  Therefore, a general version 
of the dynamic AIDS (assuming one lag in the DGP) is given by: 
 
(9)    ∆S*it = δ0 + δi∆S*it-1 + ∑
=
N
j 1
γ1ij∆lnPjt +∑
=
N
j 1
γ2ij∆lnPjt-1  
                                                + β1∆ln(C*/P)t + β2∆ln(C*/P)t-1 + λiuit-1 + γt     
 
or equivalently as: 
 
(9a)    ∆S*it = δ0 + δi∆S*it-1 + ∑
=
N
j 1
γ1ij∆lnPjt + ∑
=
N
j 1
γ2ij∆lnPjt-1 + β1∆ln(C*/P)t  
                                               
2
 Karagiannis, Katranidis and Velentzas (2000) propose a similar dynamic form of the AIDS in their 
estimation of the demand for meat in Greece.  
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                                 + β2∆ln(C*/P)t-1 + λi [S*i - αi - ∑
=
N
j 1
γij lnPj - βi ln(C*/P)]t-1 + γt  
 
where ∆ represents the first difference operator, ∆Sit-1 captures consumer habits, uit-1 is the 
estimated residuals lagged from the AIDS cointegrating equation, λi < 1 (for stability) and S*i 
and C* are defined as before.  The parameter λi measures the speed of adjustment to the long-
run equilibrium, for example, if λi = 1 adjustment is instantaneous.  Estimates of short-run 
elasticities are obtained by using (6) and (7) and the estimated parameters of (9).  
 Estimation of the long-run equilibrium requires defining the expenditure shares S*i 
and nominal expenditure C* in (4).  We propose three versions of the demand system 
depending on the definitions of S*i and C* as they relate to individuals' budgeting for 
alcoholic drinks.3 
 
Definition 1 models the share of expenditure on alcoholic drinks in terms of total alcohol 
expenditure: 
 
(10a)     S1it = αi + ∑
=
N
j 1
jtij Plnγ + βi ln(Ca/Pa)t + uit  
             i = 1,…,N (beer, spirits, wine)   
              j = 1,….,N (beer, spirits, wine)      
where 
Ca  = ∑
=
N
i 1
Cit , where Cit  is the expenditure on the ith alcoholic drink out of N at time t, 
S1it  =  Cit/Cat  =  share of expenditure on ith alcoholic drink in total alcohol expenditure at time 
t. 
Pa  =  price index of alcohol. 
Pit  =  retail price of ith alcoholic drink at time t. 
 
Definition 2 is given by the demand equations for the individual alcoholic drinks depending 
directly on aggregate consumption: 
 
(10b)     S2it = αi + ∑
=
N
j 1
jtij Plnγ + γi,N+1lnPot+ βi ln(C/P)t + uit   
 
where 
                                               
3
 Blake and Neid (1997) provides a detailed discussion of system-wide versions of the AIDS.  
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S2it  =  Cit/Ct  =  share of expenditure on ith alcoholic drink in total personal consumption at 
time t. 
Po  =  price index of  other goods. 
C/P  =  total personal consumption in real terms. 
 
Definition 3 models the demand for alcoholic drinks as depending directly on personal 
disposable income: 
 
(10c)     S3it = αi + ∑
=
N
j 1
jtij Plnγ + γi,N+1lnPot+ βi ln(Y/P)t + uit   
 
where 
S3it  =  Cit/Yt  =  share of expenditure on ith alcoholic drink in personal disposable income at 
time t. 
Y/P  =  personal disposable income in real terms. 
 
As with (4), demand theory implies a number of restrictions on equations (10a-c).  Adding up 
implies: 
 
(11)     ∑
=
N
i 1
 ai = 1 ,   ∑
=
N
i 1
γij  =  ∑
=
N
i 1
βi  =  0  
 
This can be imposed by not estimating one of the equations.  In the case of (10a) we choose 
the Nth drink equation while in (10b) and (10c) we choose the equation relating to all other 
goods. 
Further, homogeneity and symmetry requires, respectively: 
 
(12)     ∑
=
N
j 1
γij + γi,N+1 =  0    
(13)      γij  =  γji         
 
where γi,N+1 =  0 in (10a).   
 Consumer demand estimates for alcohol in Ireland are quite numerous (see for 
example, Madden, 1993) but there is limited number of studies which dissaggregate total 
alcohol demand in Ireland and analysed the consumption pattern of the different beverages 
(see for example, Thom, 1984).  Also, a number of international studies have used the static 
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AIDS specification (Jones, 1989; Nelson and Moran, 1995; Gao et al., 1995; Andrikopoulous, 
Box and Carvalho, 1997).  In contrast, Johnson, Oksanen, Veall and Fretz (1992) use an 
unrestricted error correction mechanism (ECM) to estimate short-run and long-run elasticities 
for Canadian alcohol data. However, unlike the other studies, Johnson et al. (1992) 
methodology does not incorporate a theoretical underlying demand system model. 
 More recently, Blake and Neid (1997) employed three system-wide versions of the 
static AIDS to derive time series estimates of the equations determining the demand for 
alcohol in the UK. Their estimation incorporates non-economic variables such as advertising, 
licensing, demographics and weather into demand equations provided they were the 
significant at the 5% level.4  
 Table 1 presents the point demand elasticity estimates for alcohol reported in a wide 
range of studies and thus provide a comparison of demand elasticities for beer, wine and 
spirits.  A broad range of elasticity estimates are reported, possibly explained by consumption 
patterns across countries, the use of different estimation techniques and the period under 
study. 
The own price elasticities of Walsh and Walsh (1970) are rejected in favour of the 
more robust functional form of Thom (1984).  We use Thom's estimates as a priori 
expectation of the elasticities for beer, spirits and wine.  Similar to the British results, Thom 
(1984) reports the demand for beer to be inelastic.  In contrast, for the majority of British 
studies, spirits are also found to be inelastic, whereas Thom (1984) and Blake and Neid 
(1997) find spirits to be elastic.  Thom (1984) report that wine is very responsive to price 
changes, which contrast with the findings of the British studies which report wine to be 
inelastic (though close to absolute unity). 
Elasticity estimates from other countries report similar qualitative findings.  The US, 
Canada and Australia report low price elasticities (i.e., very inelastic) ranging from -0.08 to -
0.48 for beer, -0.01 to -0.61 for spirits and -0.05 to -0.6 for wine (excluding Johnson et al., 
1992).  These are somewhat similar to low estimates from Britain (excluding Blake and Neid, 
1997).   
Expenditure (income) elasticity estimates suggest that beer is a necessity while both 
spirits and wine are luxuries.  However, the variation in these points estimates suggest that 
these elasticity estimates appear to be very poorly determined, which greatly increases the 
uncertainty facing both alcohol suppliers and government in strategic decision making. 
 
                                               
4
 Blake and Neid (1997) concluded that these non-economic variables greatly improved the explanatory 
power of the demand equations. 
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III  Data 
 
 The data is annual covering the period 1960 through to 1998.  Personal expenditure 
levels and prices for total alcohol and its components, beer, spirits and wine were obtained 
from the National Income and Expenditure Accounts of the Irish Central Statistics Office 
(CSO).  Constant prices have been calculated using 1995 as the base year.  Total personal 
expenditure and gross national disposable income at both current and constant (at 1995 
prices) market prices were obtained from the National Income and Expenditure Accounts.  
Personal expenditure per capita was calculated using population figures from those of over 15 
years of age, obtained from the CSO population database. 
 Non-economic variables include climate variables such as annual mean daily 
sunshine, annual mean daily rainfall, mean daily air temperature and mean daily summer 
(June, July and August) air temperature, and also a demographic variable, that is 15-24 year 
olds as a percentage of population over 15.  The climate variables were obtained from the 
CSO Statistical Abstract (various issues) while the population variable was obtained from the 
CSO population database in Dublin.  Definitions of the variables being used are provided in 
the Appendix.5 
 
IV  Empirical Results 
 
 In estimating the three versions of the AIDS model, given by equations (10a)-(10c), 
we first carry out a statistical evaluation of the variables used in the models.  Using standard 
augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests (Dickey and Fuller, 1981), all variables in levels are 
found (at acceptable levels of significance) to be first-difference stationary, with the exception 
of the weather variables that are stationary in levels.6 
 An iterative seemingly unrelated regression (ISUR) procedure is employed to 
estimate regressions (10a)-(10c).  This procedure adjusts for cross-equation contemporaneous 
correlation and consequently takes into account the optimisation process behind the demand 
system.7  The results of the parsimonious estimation of these equations are presented in Table 
                                               
5
 The expenditure (at constant prices) in alcohol, as a percentage of personal expenditure has fallen 
from 10.5% in 1960 to 8.1% in 1998.  In 1960, of the expenditure in alcohol, 75% was on beer, 23% on 
spirits and 2% on wine.  This breakdown has changed considerably over the last three decades; in 1998, 
Irish expenditure on alcohol was divided among beer (65%), spirits (19%) and wine (16%).  To 
conserve space the data is not presented in this paper but is available from the authors on request. 
6
 Some of the price and population variables are found to be near I(2) in our sample.  However, given 
the low power of the ADF test in small samples these variables will be treated as I(1), as they are also a 
priori expected to be first difference stationary.  To conserve space these are not reported in the paper 
but are available by request from the authors. 
7
 Since SUR is sensitive to the excluded equation (in our case the wine equation), ISUR is used instead 
of SUR,  as the process of iteration ensures that the obtained estimates asymptotically approach those 
of the maximum likelihood method (see Judge, Griffiths, Hill, Lutkepohl and Lee, 1980). 
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2.  For each definition, the three alcoholic drinks have estimations from two regressions, 
associated with and without non-economic variables in the regressions. 
 In general, the equations including non-economics variables perform better in terms 
of goodness of fit, stationarity of the residuals and diagnostic tests.  In each equation, the R2 
(bar) is higher when non-economic variables are included.  Similarly the presence of serial 
correlation while still remaining a problem in some equations is reduced.  Finally stationarity 
of the residuals can be established at higher levels of significance when non-economic 
variables are included. 
The results are similar across the three versions of the AIDS model.  The own-price 
estimates for beer and spirits indicate a positive relationship with their shares, and, 
conversely, the own-price estimate for wine gives a negative relationship. 
Independent of the form of AIDS model chosen, the results from the beer regressions 
are robust to the inclusion of non-economic data.  For each of the alternative AIDS models, 
the own-price estimates for beer and spirits indicate a positive relationship with their shares.  
Conversely, the own-price estimate for wine gives a negative sign.  Also evident are the 
cross-price and expenditure effects associated with the three alcoholic products.  The results 
are similar to Blake and Neid (1997). 
Of the non-economic variables the young population variable (i.e., ln(15-24)) is 
significant at the 10% level in most of the regressions and to a lesser degree the weather 
variables enter the parsimonious regressions.  For example, one interesting result comes from 
Table 2 (definition 1) which shows the almost one for one trade off between beer and spirits 
with changes in summer temperature (ln(sumtemp)). A 1oC increase in the year's mean 
summer temperature would result in a 13% increase in the beer share in total alcohol and a 
13.5% decrease in the spirits share in total alcohol. 
Since all the economic variables enter the regressions in level form (although they are 
all first difference stationary), interpreting the results from these regressions relies on the 
stationarity of the residuals.  The standard augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test with various 
lags on the residuals of the equations (10a)-(10c) are employed to test for the stationarity of 
the residuals.  Under definition 1, both the beer and spirits equations (including non-economic 
variables) are stationary at 5% and 10% levels of significance, respectively, while the wine 
equation was stationary at higher levels of significance. For definition 2, the three alcohol 
equations are stationary, the beer and wine equations at 10% and the spirits at 1% level of 
significance. Finally, in the case of definition 3, stationarity existed in the spirits equation at 
1% level of significance and in the wine equation at 5% level of significance while in the beer 
equation stationarity could only be established at higher levels of significance. 
Table 3 reports the computed long-run point elasticity estimates from the static AIDS, 
expressed in equations (6) and (7).  Taking the estimates from the equations that include non-
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economic variables, the own-price elasticities range from -0.42 to -0.76 for beer, from -0.68 
to -0.92 for spirits and from -1.38 to -1.95 for wine. This means beer and spirits are price 
inelastic while wine is price elastic.  The expenditure elasticities range from 0.77 to 1.02 for 
beer, 0.81 to 1.04 for spirits and 1.78 to 2.33 for wine and they indicate that beer and spirits 
are necessities while wine is a luxury.  The expenditure point estimates, 1.02 for beer and 
1.04 for spirits have wide confidence intervals given that the expenditure variable, ln(C/P) is 
insignificant at the 10% level.  Our estimates are similar to Thom (1984) estimates and Blake 
and Neid (1997) UK estimates, in particular with regard to beer and wine price elasticity and 
the three expenditure elasticities.  In comparison to other studies (as shown in Table 1), our 
price elasticity results are less price inelastic, but are however, more in line with a priori 
expectations.  The expenditure elasticities fall within the broad spectrum of these studies. 
A final set of tests surround the homogeneity and symmetry restrictions imposed in 
the AIDS, as given in equations (12) and (13), respectively.  Table 2 shows our Wald chi-
squared statistic for homogeneity alone, symmetry alone and homogeneity and symmetry 
together.  The results of the tests show that homogeneity and symmetry are rejected for all our 
systems of equations except for definition 1 version of the AIDS with non-economic variables 
excluded.  These results are similar to most international studies that have used aggregate 
data, including Blake and Nied (1997) and, in the case of Ireland, Madden (1993) who tested 
these restrictions on a wide range of Irish commodities.  It is interesting to note that in most 
cases the equations excluding non-economic variables perform better under homogeneity and 
symmetry.  This is a priori expected given that non-economic variables should not be robust 
to the imposition of demand theory restrictions. 
 
V  Dynamic AIDS 
 
 The preferred long-run equilibrium model to use for the dynamic AIDS is based on a 
selected range of criterion, which can be obtained from the above estimation and testing, that 
is Tables 2 and 3.  Our criterion is as follows; first, we look at how well do the three 
specifications perform when demand theory is applied, in particular do the estimated 
elasticities imply a downward sloping demand curve for alcohol.  Looking at our calculated 
long run elasticities we see that all imply a downward sloping demand curve. Table 2 
indicates that the symmetry and homogeneity restrictions are accepted in the case of 
definition 1 of the AIDS model, and are only accepted at higher levels of significance for the 
two other versions of the AIDS model. 
Second, we look at various diagnostic tests obtained from the regressions such as 
goodness of fit, serial correlation, etc.  From this it appears that definitions 2 and 3 are the 
preferred options here especially looking at serial correlation and the residual sum of squares.  
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Third, we consider which model indicates a stationary (long-run) relationship between the 
dependent and explanatory variables, i.e. whether the residuals are stationary.  The only 
version of the AIDS model that satisfies the stationarity condition for the three alcohol 
equations is definition 2.  Stationarity is only significant at a significance level greater than 
10% for the wine equation under definition 1 and for the beer equation under definition 3. 
  Overall, all three versions of the static AIDS model perform well and give acceptable 
results such that any one of the three could be used for estimating a dynamic form.  We 
choose definition 2 as the preferred model8 mainly because the three alcohol equations are 
more strongly stationary which is necessary condition in estimating the dynamic error 
correction process.  Another important reason for choosing definition 2 over 1 or 3 is that it 
uses consumption expenditure data, which is a preferable to disposable income to use in a 
demand system like the AIDS.  
The disequilibrium of the static AIDS model - definition 2 version - will enable us to 
reconcile the short run behaviour of the demand for the individual beverages with their long-
run behaviour.  Using (9), the equations that will be estimated are as follows:  
 
(14)   ∆S2b,t = α1b+ α2b∆S2b,t-1 + γb0∆lnPb,t + γb1∆lnPb,t-1 + γs0∆lnPs,t + γs1∆lnPs,t-1  
                            + γw0∆lnPw,t + γw1∆lnPw,t-1 + βb0lnPo,t + βb1lnPo,t-1 + δb0∆ln(C/P)t  
                            + δb1∆ln(C/P)t-1 + 2b1lnsunt + 2b2lnraint + λbub,t-1 + γt   
 
where ub,t-1 is the estimated residuals lagged one period from the definition 2 version of the 
AIDS beer equation 
 
(15)   ∆S2s,t = α1s+ α2s∆S2s,t-1 + γb0∆lnPb,t + γb1∆lnPb,t-1 + γs0∆lnPs,t + γs1∆lnPs,t-1  
                            + γw0∆lnPw,t + γw1∆lnPw,t-1 + βs0∆lnPo,t + βs1∆lnPo,t-1 + δs0∆ln(C/P)t  
                            + δs1∆ln(C/P)t-1 + 2s1δ1lnraint + 2s2∆ln(15-24)t + 2s3∆ln(15-24)t-1  
                             + λsus,t-1 + γt    
 
where us,t-1 is the estimated residuals lagged one period from the definition 2 version of the 
AIDS spirits equation. 
 
(16)    ∆S2w,t = α1w+ α2w∆S2w,t-1 + γb0∆lnPb,t + γb1∆lnPb,t-1 + γs0∆lnPs,t + γs1∆lnPs,t-1  
                            + γw0∆lnPw,t + γw1∆lnPw,t-1 + βw0∆lnPo,t + βw1∆lnPo,t-1 + δw0∆ln(C/P)t  
                            + δw1∆ln(C/P)t-1 + 2w1∆ln(15-24)t + 2w2∆ln(15-24)t-1 + λwuw,t-1 + γt  
                                               
8
 We also estimate the dynamic form of the AIDS model under definitions 1 and 3.  To conserve space 
these are not reported in the paper but are available by request from the authors. 
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where uw,t-1 is the estimated residuals lagged one period from the definition 2 version of the 
AIDS wine equation 
In the equations above the first-difference terms on the right hand side capture the 
short-run disturbances in the respective shares of the individual drinks in total personal 
expenditure.  We include current values and a lagged value for the changes in prices, changes 
in expenditure and changes in population variables to determine whether past or present 
values are significant in determining the short run disturbances of the individual drinks.  In 
estimation, a parsimonious form of equations (14)-(16) is reported. 
The error correction term ui where i = beer, spirits and wine, captures the long-run 
equilibrium relationship, given by the standard AIDS equation, and λi captures the speed of 
adjustment toward the long-run equilibrium.   If λi is large or closer to one in absolute value 
then there is a rapid adjustment, i.e. the disturbance quickly disappears and we are back along 
the long run path.  The smaller that λi is the slower the adjustment back to long run 
equilibrium.  In estimating the dynamic AIDS all variables in equations (14)-(16) must be 
stationary. Our climate variables in the beer and spirits equation are entered in level form 
since they are I(0), i.e. they are stationary in levels.   
The dynamic AIDS is estimated using an ISUR procedure, and the results for the 
system are given in Table 4.  Both beer and spirits equations give satisfactory results with 
most of the variables significant at 10% levels, the R2 are high and the equations pass all of 
the diagnostic tests.  Our beer gives a value for λ as -0.4022.  This means that 40% of the 
disturbance to the long-run equilibrium in the previous period is corrected or adjusted back to 
long-run equilibrium in this period.  The spirits error correction term (-0.9195) indicates that 
consumers are able to adjust spirits consumption to long run equilibrium considerably faster.  
90% of the disturbance is corrected or adjusted back to that long-run equilibrium path within 
one period.  Looking to our wine equation we see that most of the estimates are insignificant 
at the 10% level.  The R2 is also very low but it still passes all diagnostic tests.  The error 
correction term (significant at the 12% level) indicates that approximately one-third of the 
disturbance to the long-run equilibrium path is corrected within the next period.  
The short run point elasticities were calculated using (6) and (7) and are presented in 
Table 7 along with the estimated range for our long run point elasticities.  They indicate that 
beer is price inelastic while spirits and wine are price elastic.  Beer and spirits are found to be 
necessities in the short run while wine is a luxury.  Using the calculated long-run and short-
run point elasticities and also the calculated error correction term we are now able to interpret 
the pattern of demand for the individual drinks. 
Looking at the short-run pattern of the demand for beer we estimate a price elasticity 
of -0.581.  This lies within the range given for the long-run elasticities therefore there exists 
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small changes in the price response between the short and long run.  The short-run 
expenditure elasticity of 0.144 is minimal and less than that of the long run expenditure 
elasticity, hence there is less of a response to expenditure changes in the short run than over 
the long run.  The short-run own price elasticity for spirits is given as -1.2155, which 
indicates that spirits is price elastic in the short run.  In the long run, spirits are price inelastic, 
this implies a change in demand behaviour for spirits when moving from the short to the long 
run.  Also given the fact that the speed of adjustment back to the long run equilibrium is very 
rapid (as given by λspirits = -0.9195) then the behaviour of spirits demand changes quickly 
from being price elastic to being price inelastic, that is, the long-run elasticity9.  The 
expenditure elasticity lies within the range given by the long run elasticities so again there are 
small changes in the expenditure response between the short and long run.  Finally wine has 
short-run elasticities indicating it to be price elastic and expenditure elastic in the short run, a 
result which is of similar magnitude to its long run behaviour. The long-run wine elasticities 
are slightly larger in absolute value indicating that responses to changes in price and 
expenditure are slightly more sensitive over the long run.   
  
VII  Conclusions 
 
 This paper uses three versions of Deaton and Muellbauer 's AIDS model to calculate 
long-run elasticities of beer, spirits and wine.  The demand theory restrictions and other 
diagnostic tests all three versions of the static AIDS perform well and the elasticities 
calculated (excluding some irrational estimates) are acceptable.  From calculating our long-
run elasticities we find that beer and spirits are price inelastic while wine is price elastic.  The 
own price elasticities range from -0.42 to -0.76 for beer, -0.68 to -0.92 for spirits and -1.38 to 
-1.95 for wine. The expenditure elasticities indicate that wine is a luxury (elasticity measure 
range from 1.78 to 2.33) while both beer (0.77 to 1.02) and spirits (0.81 to1.04) are 
necessities.  These point estimates are similar to previous studies (see for example, Thom, 
1984, and Blake and Neid, 1997). 
In calculating the short-run elasticities we estimated a dynamic error correction form 
of the AIDS by employing a one-lagged dynamic data generating process.  This was achieved 
by selecting one of the three versions of the AIDS model based on selected criteria, which 
ranged from demand theory restrictions to the possibility of cointegration between the 
dependent and independent variables. Definition 2 of the AIDS, which defines the 
expenditure share as that share of expenditure on each alcoholic drink from the total alcohol 
expenditure, was taken as the long-run equilibrium model. 
                                               
9
 The coefficient on the spirits price effect is also insignificant, unlike the case for beer.  Therefore the 
short-run spirits price effect is likely to have wide confidence intervals.  
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We found that in the short run beer was price inelastic while spirits and wine were 
price elastic.  The expenditure elasticities indicated that beer is a necessity in the short run 
while spirits and wine were luxuries.  This meant that both beer and wine exhibit the same 
behaviour in the short and long run.  However the demand for spirits changes from being 
price elastic in the short run to be price inelastic in the long run.  Moreover using a dynamic 
generating process we were able to calculate consumers' speed of adjustment and we found 
that consumers are able to adjust spirits consumption to the long-run equilibrium considerably 
faster. 
Given the significantly high rate of excise duties on alcohol in Ireland, policy 
implications of the elasticity measures are relevant.  Concentrating on the long run elasticities 
we have already seen that both beer and spirits are price inelastic.  This suggest that an 
increase in price on beer or spirits (due to an increase in excise) will increase tax revenue 
since the price change will decrease the quantity demanded ceteris paribus, but not by as 
much as the increase in price (tax) and thus increases government revenue.  This is all the 
more important since excises on beer and spirits provide bigger revenue than excises on wine.  
Note however, the ceteris paribus assumption is unlikely to hold in practice.  An increase in 
tax would increase the incentive for suppliers of alcohol to increase the price they charge to 
consumers in order to cover lower profit margins10. The fact that beer and spirits are price 
inelastic provides the incentive or opportunity for the government and then also the alcohol 
producers to increase price.  Therefore the actual excise increase may in fact result in a 
reduction in revenue. Hence analysis of consumer demand for alcoholic beverages both in the 
long run and in the short run and also analysis that incorporates dynamic industry effects is 
necessary in deriving tax/revenue effects on alcohol.  This study goes in some way to 
supplying such analysis.  
The dynamic approach taken in this paper to estimate demand systems has future 
applications, among others, in agricultural, health and energy economics.  The fact that the 
AIDS model is a very popular makes it easier to apply a dynamic AIDS similar to the one 
used here.  
 
 
                                               
10
 With additional duty on alcohol, profit margins (as a percentage of price) for alcohol would fall. 
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Table 1: Comparison of Demand Elasticities for Beer, Wine and Spirits 
   
Own price 
elasticity 
  
Expenditure 
elasticity 
Study Model and period Beer Spirits Wine  Beer Spirits Wine 
 
Ireland 
        
Thom (1984) AIDS model -0.59 -1.29 -1.61  0.8 1.386 1.23 
 1969(1) to 1980(4) to -0.76 to -1.54 to -1.60     
Walsh and Linear Model  1953-68 0.09 -0.57 -  0.63 1.94 - 
Walsh(1970)      to 0.79 to 2.06  
 
Britain 
        
Blake and Neid (1997) AIDS model  1952-91 -0.95 -1.32 -0.95  0.89 0.98 1.61 
Clements & Working's Model -0.19 -0.24 -0.23  0.41 1.81 1.91 
Selvanathan(1987)  1955-1975        
Duffy (1983)  Log-Lin, Lin,  Simultaneous - 0.8 0.65  0.8 1.6 2.5 
 Mdls  1963-83  to 1 to 0.87  to 1.1   
Duffy (1987) Rotterdam Model 1963-83 -0.29 -0.51 -0.77  0.6 1.42 1.7 
Jones (1989) AIDS Model -0.27 -0.95 -0.77  0.31 1.14 1.15 
 1964-1983 (Quat)        
McGuinness (1983) Linear Model  1956-1979 -0.18 -0.3 0.38  0.13 1.54 1.11 
Selvanathan (1989) Theil's Differential -0.2 -0.79 -0.49  0.41 2.18 1.74 
 Approach  1955-1985        
Selvanathan (1991) Rotterdam Model  1955-85 -0.13 -0.31 -0.4  0.52 1.83 1.31 
 
United States 
        
Gao et al  (1995) AIDS equivalent Model -0.23 -0.40 -0.25  -0.09 5.03 1.21 
 1987-1989 (cross sectional)        
Nelson & Moran (1995) Rotterdam, AIDS(1), -0.08 -0.08 -0.26  0.79 1.26 1.06 
 CBS, NBR  1964-1990        
Clements & Working's Model -0.09 -0.1 -0.22  0.75 1.34 0.46 
Selvanathan (1987) 1949-1982        
Selvanathan (1991) Rotterdam Model -0.11 -0.11 -0.05  0.71 1.36 0.63 
 1949-1982        
 
Canada 
        
Andrikopoulous  AIDS Model -0.48 -0.54 -0.51  0.96 0.083 2.22 
et al (1997) 1958-1987        
Selvanathan (1991) Rotterdam Model 1953-82 -0.26 -0.01 -0.16  0.71 1.29 0.97 
Johnson et al (1992) Unrestricted ECM        
 long run elasticity -0.14 0.37 -1.17  0.27 1.02 2.19 
  to -0.28 to 0.84 to -1.26  to 0.46 to 1.27 to 2.62 
 short run elasticity -0.3 -0.85 -0.88  0.16 1 1 
   to -0.45 to -0.70  to 0.48   
 
Australia 
        
Clements & Rotterdam Model -0.11 -0.53 -0.4  0.75 2.32 0.75 
Johnson (1983) 1956-1977        
Clements & Working's Model -0.12 -0.52 -0.34  0.73 2.5 0.62 
Selvanathan (1987) 1956-1977        
Selvanathan  (1991) 
 
Rotterdam Model 1955-85 -0.15 -0.61 -0.6  0.84 1.94 0.73 
Notes: (1) Only the estimates from the AIDS model are reported. 
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Table 2: Iterative Seemingly Unrelated Regression of the Static AIDS Model of Demand for Alcohol in Ireland 
 
Definition 1 
S1it = αi + ∑
=
N
j 1
jtij Plnγ + βi ln(Ca/Pa)t + uit 
 
Definition 2 
S2it = αi + ∑
=
N
j 1
jtij Plnγ + γi,N+1lnPot+ βi ln(C/P)t + uit 
 
Definition 3 
S3it = αi + ∑
=
N
j 1
jtij Plnγ + γi,N+1lnPot+ βi ln(Y/P)t + uit 
 Beer Spirits Wine  Beer Spirits Wine  Beer Spirits Wine 
                     
Intercept 1.036 
(8.395) 
0.699 
(4.237) 
0.025 
(0.144) 
-0.564 
(-2.985) 
-0.046 
 
0.865  0.028 
(0.945) 
0.033 
(1.286) 
-0.073 
(-2.070) 
-0.174 
(-7.215) 
-0.033 
(-2.094) 
0.017 
(1.420) 
 0.101 
(4.787) 
0.042 
(1.580) 
0.004 
(0.170) 
-0.130 
(-7.417) 
-0.021 
(-2.576) 
0.170 
(2.509) 
LnPb 0.153 
(4.094) 
0.159 
(4.598) 
-0.227 
(-4.383) 
-0.120 
(-3.578) 
0.074 -0.040  0.017 
(2.796) 
0.013 
(2.409) 
0.030 
(-4.093) 
-0.018 
(-2.538) 
0.002 
(0.478) 
-0.007 
(-3.066) 
 0.018 
(3.551) 
0.025 
(4.966) 
-0.020 
(-3.161) 
-0.004 
(-1.212) 
0.002 
(0.824) 
-0.003 
(-2.244) 
LnPs -0.196 
(-4.446) 
-0.211 
(-5.110) 
0.314 
(5.149) 
0.088 
(1.956) 
-0.118 0.123  0.010 
(1.666) 
0.014 
(2.655) 
0.043 
(6.016) 
0.007 
(1.158) 
-0.007 
(-2.123) 
0.010 
(3.342) 
 0.013 
(2.655) 
-0.003 
(-0.467) 
0.038 
(6.289) 
0.001 
(0.330) 
-0.005 
(-2.594) 
0.005 
(3.192) 
LnPw 0.061 
(2.033) 
0.069 
(2.464) 
-0.112 
(-2.685) 
-0.003 
(-0.114) 
0.051 -0.066  0.009 
(1.855) 
0.005 
(1.227) 
-0.015 
(-2.594) 
-0.001 
(-0.148) 
0.003 
(1.119) 
-0.004 
(-2.149) 
 0.005 
(1.237) 
0.011 
(2.783) 
-0.013 
(-2.643) 
0.002 
(0.641) 
0.002 
(1.407) 
-0.002 
(-1.936) 
LnPo - 
 
- - - - -  -0.035 
(-7.002) 
-0.031 
(-6.904) 
-0.002 
(-0.272) 
0.001 
(0.177) 
0.002 
(0.904) 
0.002 
(1.206) 
 -0.032 
(-7.880) 
-0.031 
(-8.378) 
-0.006 
(-1.113) 
-0.002 
(-0.925) 
0.002 
(1.039) 
0.001 
(0.704) 
Ln (C/P)* -0.066 
(-3.330) 
-0.067 
(-3.620) 
0.046 
(1.672) 
-0.023 
(-1.274) 
0.020 0.090  0.003 
(0.803) 
0.001 
(0.470) 
0.012 
(2.817) 
0.001 
(0.417) 
0.005 
(2.411) 
0.009 
(6.839) 
 -0.008 
(-3.243) 
-0.010 
(-4.469) 
0.001 
(0.442) 
-0.004 
(-2.649) 
0.003 
(3.004) 
0.004 
(7.348) 
Ln sumtemp - 0.130 
(-2.849) 
- -0.135 
(-2.954) 
- 0.005  - - - - - -  - - - - - - 
Ln sun - - 
 
- - - -  - 0.007 
(1.697) 
- - - -  - - - - - - 
Ln rain - - 
 
- - - -  - -0.009 
(-2.637) 
- -0.005 
(-1.820) 
- -  - - - - - - 
Ln 15-24 - - 
 
- 0.464 
(9.677) 
- -0.464  - - - 0.067 
(9.020) 
- -0.030 
(-7.366) 
 - 0.027 
(3.124) 
- 0.062 
(10.815) 
- -0.017 
(-7.849) 
                     
R2(bar) 0.82 0.85 0.86 0.87 - -  0.70 0.76 0.85 0.91 0.63 0.78  0.76 0.79 0.76 0.88 0.79 0.89 
ADF -3.72 -3.84 
[3] 
-2.68 
[3] 
-3.42 
[3] 
-1.58 
[3] 
-2.83 
[3] 
 -3.33 
[1] 
-3.37 
[1] 
-2.28 
[1] 
-4.65 
[1] 
-1.70 
[5] 
-3.30 
[5] 
 -1.87 
[3] 
-3.03 
[1] 
-2.17 
[5] 
-5.46 
[1] 
-2.28 
[5] 
-3.56 
[1] 
                     
AUTO[1] 13.42 10.46 21.94 18.32 - -  9.96 4.44 14.31 3.62 29.13 16.50  13.01 8.81 18.48 9.32 22.59 9.19 
HETERO[1] 0.28 0.39 11.35 9.22 - -  2.15 0.98 1.72 0.11 11.72 14.37  0.51 0.23 6.07 0.00 10.21 5.34 
                     
 Non-economic 
variables excluded 
 Non-economic 
variables included 
  Non-economic 
variables excluded 
 Non-economic variables 
included 
  Non-economic 
variables excluded 
 Non-economic variables 
included 
 
Homogeneity 5.569  28.629   9.567  59.247   32.755  123.809  
Symmetry 7.196  11.711   30.183  23.219   36.088  17.008  
Homogeneity 
and Symmetry 
 
10.408  
 
226.291   75.887  121.515   48.040  136.623  
Notes: For Definition 1, the wine equation is not estimated, rather the parameters are calculated to ensure the adding up restriction hold.  The estimates in this table are based on an Iterative Seemingly Unrelated 
Regression (ISUR).  t-statistics are in parentheses.   Lag lengths and degrees of freedom for the diagnostic tests are reported in brackets.  The period of under study is 1960-98.  i ,j = beer, spirits, wine.  Tests for the 
homogeneity and Symmetry restrictions are a Wald test distributed Π2 (3) and jointly tested with a Π2 (6) distribution.  See Appendix for definition of variables and terms. 
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Table 3: Estimates of Demand Elasticities 
   
Definition 1 
  
Definition 2 
  
Definition 3 
  Excl Incl  Excl Incl  Excl Incl 
  
        
Own-Price Beer -0.69 -0.68  -0.70 -0.77  -0.58 -0.42 
 Spirits  0.01 -0.68   0.57 -0.75  0.84 -0.93 
 Wine -0.36 -1.95  -0.58 -1.59  -0.60 -1.39 
          
Income Beer  0.89  0.89   1.05  1.03   0.83  0.77 
 Spirits  1.15  0.92   1.43  1.04   1.06  0.82 
 Wine  1.26  2.18   1.67  2.33   1.51  1.78 
          
 
Notes: Figures derived from the regressions results reported in Table 2.  Excl refers to the estimated regressions that 
exclude non-economic variables and  Incl refers to the estimated regressions that include non-economic variables. 
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Table 4: Dynamic AIDS Modelling 
Definition 2 
∆S2i,t  =  α1i  +  α2i ∆S2i,t-1  + ∑∑ ∆
= ij
j-ti, ij
1
0
Plnγ +∑
=
1
0
j-to,ij Pln
j
β  + ∑
=
∆
1
0
j-tij )/ln(
j
PCδ +  8iui,t-1 + γt 
 
                 Beer                   Spirits Wine 
 
 
Parsimonious Non-
Parsimonious 
 Parsimonious Non-
Parsimonious 
 Parsimonious Non-
Parsimonious 
Intercept -0.008 (-1.430) 
-0.011 
(-0.492) 
 0.029 
(2.441) 
0.019 
(1.191) 
 -0.015 
(-3.158) 
-0.018 
(-2.250) 
∆S2i,t-1 -0.155 (-1.632) 
-0.201 
(-1.229) 
 -0.045 
(-0.459) 
0.010 
(0.088) 
 -0.010 
(-0.856) 
-0.061 
(-0.394) 
∆lnPb,t 0.024 (4.039) 
0.021 
(2.649) 
 - -0.004 
(-0.807) 
 -0.001 
(-0.849) 
-0.002 
(-0.695) 
∆lnPb,t-1 - 
 
0.009 
(1.098) 
 0.006 
(2.185) 
0.009 
(1.766) 
 - -0.001 
(-0.428) 
∆lnPs,t 0.020 (3.042) 
0.021 
(1.974) 
 0.004 
(1.125) 
0.009 
(1.224) 
 - 0.001 
(0.225) 
∆lnPs,t-1 - 
 
-0.004 
(-0.397) 
 - -0.005 
(-0.724) 
 -0.001 
(-0.737) 
-0.001 
(-0.324) 
∆lnPw,t - 
 
0.002 
(0.448) 
 - -0.002 
(-0.764) 
 0.001 
(1.991) 
0.001 
(0.634) 
∆lnPw,t-1 -0.004 (-1.600) 
-0.003 
(-0.706) 
 -0.004 
(-2.226) 
-0.004 
(-1.508) 
 - -0.0003 
(-0.186) 
∆lnPo,t -0.048 (-7.057) 
-0.041 
(-3.368) 
 -0.010 
(-2.294) 
-0.006 
(-0.737) 
 -0.002 
(-0.844) 
-0.003 
(-0.591) 
∆lnPo,t-1 - 
 
-0.010 
(-0.702) 
 - 0.001 
(0.055) 
 - 0.003 
(0.590) 
∆ln(C/P)t -0.047 (-4.596) -0.037 (-2.258)  -0.029 (-3.827) -0.024 (-2.063)  - 0.0002 (0.035) 
∆ln(C/P)t-1 - 
 
-0.007 
(-0.480) 
 0.025 
(3.558) 
0.018 
(1.793) 
 0.006 
(2.068) 
0.006 
(1.114) 
Lnsunt 0.012 (3.454) 
0.010 
(2.138) 
 - 0.003 
(0.988) 
 -0.004 
(-4.111) 
-0.002 
(-1.459) 
Lnraint -0.004 (-1.576) 
-0.005 
(-1.270) 
 -0.009 
(-4.800) 
-0.007 
(-2.466) 
 - 0.001 
(0.674) 
Lnsumtempt - 0.003  -0.008 -0.010  0.007 0.008 
 
 (0.274)  (-1.829) (-1.453)  (4.058) (2.380) 
Lntempt - -0.001  - 0.004  - -0.001 
 
 (-0.055)   (0.669)   (-0.189) 
∆ln(15-24)t - 
 
0.027 
(0.833) 
 0.043 
(3.324) 
0.044 
(1.933) 
 - -0.007 
(-0.616) 
∆ln(15-24)t-1 - 
 
-0.030 
(-0.963) 
 - -0.015 
(-0.659) 
 - 0.005 
(0.447) 
ui,t-1 -0.346 -0.406  -0.691 -0.813  -0.183 -0.197 
 
(-2.421) (-2.217)  (-5.436) (-5.708)  (-1.664) (-1.333) 
 
       
R2(bar) 0.897 0.734  0.601 0.542  0.430 0.260 
AUTO[1] 0.419 0.419  0.014 0.293  0.316 0.353 
HETRO[1] 0.010 2.153  0.206 0.383  0.699 0.074 
       
 
Notes:  Results are based on Defintion 2 of the dynamic AIDS model, equations (14)-(16).  The estimates in this table are based on an Iterative 
Seemingly Unrelated Regression (ISUR).  t-statistics are in parentheses.   Degrees of freedom for the diagnostic tests are reported in brackets.  i 
= beer, spirits, wine.  The period of under study is 1960-98.  See Appendix for definition of variables and terms. 
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Table 5: Estimates of Long- and Short-Run Demand Elasticities 
   
Long Run 
  
Short Run 
 
  
      
Own-Price Beer -0.765  -0.527  
 Spirits -0.751  -0.851   
 Wine -1.593  -0.796  
  
      
Income Beer 
 1.026   0.157  
 Spirits 
 1.039   0.856  
 Wine 
 2.326  1.862  
        
 
Notes: Figures derived from the parsimonious regressions results reported in Table 4. 
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Appendix 
 
List of the data symbols considered in the empirical analysis. 
 
S1b   
                       
Share of personal expenditure (nominal) per capita on beer in total personal 
expenditure (nominal) per capita on alcohol. 
 
S1s    
 
Share of personal expenditure (nominal) per capita on spirits in total personal 
expenditure (nominal) per capita on alcohol. 
 
S1w   
 
Share of personal expenditure (nominal) per capita on wine in total personal 
expenditure (nominal) per capita on alcohol. 
 
S2b   
 
Share of personal expenditure (nominal) per capita on beer in total personal 
expenditure (nominal) per capita. 
 
S2s  
 
Share of personal expenditure (nominal) per capita on spirits in total personal 
expenditure (nominal) per capita. 
 
S2w  
 
Share of personal expenditure (nominal) per capita on wine in total personal 
expenditure (nominal) per capita. 
 
S3b   
 
Share of personal expenditure (nominal) per capita on beer in national disposable 
income (nominal) per capita. 
 
S3s  
 
Share of personal expenditure (nominal) per capita on spirits in national 
disposable income (nominal) per capita. 
 
S3w   
 
Share of personal expenditure (nominal) per capita on wine in national disposable 
income (nominal) per capita. 
 
LnPb   Natural log of the retail price of beer (1995 = 100). 
 
lnPs   Natural log of the retail price of sprits (1995 = 100). 
 
lnPw   Natural log of the retail price of wine (1995 = 100). 
 
ln(Ca/Pa)  Natural log of per capita real personal consumption expenditure on total alcohol 
(1995 prices). 
 
ln(C/P)  Natural log of per capita real personal consumption expenditure (1995 prices). 
 
ln(Y/P)  Natural log of per capita real national disposable income (1995 prices). 
 
lnPo   Natural log of the retail price of other goods (1995 = 100). 
 
lnsun   Natural log of mean daily sunshine. 
 
lnrain  Natural log of mean daily rainfall. 
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lntemp    Natural log of mean daily temperature. 
 
lnsumtemp    Natural log of mean daily summer (June, July and August) temperature. 
 
Ln(15-24)   Natural log of the percentage of 15-24 year olds in the population over the age of 
15. 
Definition of the individual alcoholic drinks 
 
Beer  Includes stout, ale and lager. 
 
 
Spirits Includes whiskey, gin rum, brandy and other spirits. 
 
 
Wine Includes cider and perry. 
 
 
 
Definition of the diagnostic tests 
 
RSS                   Residual sum of squares. 
 
MEAN              Mean of the dependent variable. 
 
AUTO[1]          Lagrange multiplier statistic for residual autocorrelation ( χ2 distributed with 
1 degree of freedom; 5% critical value = 3.84). 
 
HETERO[1]     Langrange multiplier test for heteroscedasticity of the residuals based on a 
regression of squared residuals on squared fitted values (χ2 distributed with 1 
degree of freedom). 
 
ADF[n]                 Augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root test statistic on the residuals of the 
estimated regression.  The ADF is based on 
∆xt = α +βx t-1 + γTime + ∑
=
n
j 1
δj∆x t-j + vt    where xt denotes the residuals of 
the regression and [n] denotes lag length to ensure vt is white noise.  The 
critical values for stationarity of the residuals are (-3.53 at the 5% level and -
3.21 at the 10% level).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
